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THE LIABILITY OF THE ASSOCIATES IN A
DEFECTIVE CORPORATION.
To say that it is the present day tendency to conduct business and
commercial enterprises through the medium of corporations in order
to secure the resulting limitations of liability to those engaged
therein, is to state an obvious fact. Partnerships are fast falling into
disuse; individuals are organizing "one man corporations," that is
to say, corporations in which all the stock is owned or controlled by
one individual; and in direct proportion to the hazard of the pro-
posed enterprise, intending incorporators are seeking the advantage
of those states in which the requirements for publicity and official
supervision are lax and in which subscription for any considerable
proportion of the shares of the capital stock prior to organization,
is not a necessity, to the end that they may risk but little in their
quest for gain. It goes without saying that the vast majority of the
companies organized in the United States are incorporated in good
faith, but it is unfortunate that it is possible to evade the laws of the
state of the residence of the incorporators, when its policy towards
corporations as declared by its legislative enactments, imposes too
many irksome restrictions and guarantees to the public a protection
which the incorporators would seek to avoid. And so, too, it is
unfortunate that frequently those who have extended credit to a cor-
poration, relying on the published statement of its authorized capital
stock, find when it is too late that but a modicum of the authorized
shares have been subscribed for and issued, and that the assets of the
corporation are practically nil.
But the very facility with which corporations may be organized
in many of our states and territories frequently breeds a certain care-
lessness on the part of those who would shelter themselves behind
the outward form and show of a corporation. Though the require-
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ments are but few, often some of the most essential are not complied
with, and the important questions arise: Can such defects render the
incorporation invalid and impose upon those associated by virtue
thereof the liability of co-partners? And if so, what are those
defects ?
Partnerships and stock corporations are both associations of indi-
viduals, united in a common business venture, under an agreement
to divide among themselves the profits thereof. In a partnership
each associate assumes the liability of the entire partnership indebt-
edness. In a corporation the liability of the associates is limited.
At common law every association engaged in a commercial ven-
ture under an agreement among the associates to divide profits was
a partnership and each associate had imposed upon him the liability
of a partner.! A grant of authority from the sovereign was neces-
sary to enable the associates to limit their liability. This grant was
termed a charter. It was a franchise to associate as a corporation,
to limit the liability of each associate to the amount by him sub-
scribed as capital, for the prosecution of the joint venture, and ra
relieve him from all liability when his subscription was fully paid.
In the United States, the right to incorporate was rarely con-
ferred by executive grant; it was most commonly granted by the
legislature by special act. By reason of abuses which crept into this
practice and hindrance of general and public legislation, incorpora-
tion by special act has very generally fallen into disuse or is for-
bidden by constitution. General incorporation acts obtain in most
states and a substantial compliance with their provisions is the only
method of obtaining the right to associate as a corporation and to
limit the personal liability of the associates. These acts are in effect
general charters to all who qualify according to their provisions.
Such acts usually provide that a specified number of persons
desiring to incorporate, shall file with the clerk of the county where
the principal place of business is proposed to be situated, a written
instrument, usually called the Articles of Incorporation, by them
subscribed and acknowledged, stating the name of the proposed cor-
poration, its place of business, the purposes of the incorporation, the
amount of the capital stock and the number of shares into which
it shall be divided. A certified copy of these articles is usually
required to be filed with the secretary of state, who thereupon is
usually required to issue under the great seal a certificate of incorpo-
ration.
z. Story on Partnership, Sec. 2; Bertholdv. Goldsmith, 24 How. (U. S.
536; Hunt v. Oliver, 118 U. S. 221; Karrick v. Hannaman, x68 U. S. 328,
334.
ASSOCIATES IN DEFECTIVE CORPORATION
The articles of incorporation, when prepared, executed and filed
in conformity with the enabling act, constitute the special charter
from the state to the associates. In other words, the articles partic-
ularize and limit the powers authorized by the general charter or
general incorporation act, to the needs and purposes of the incorpo-
rators; thereby there is conferred upon them the mere right to
organize a corporation and to limit the liability of each to the amount
proposed to be contributed by him to the joint venture. A corpora-
tion in posse exists, which, after organization, will become a corpora-
tion in esse.2 It follows that no association of individuals organized
to engage in a business enterprise by any act or declaration not in
pursuance of the enabling statute can divest itself of the character of
a partnership and clothe itself with that of a corporation.3
It frequently happens, however, that such an association in good
faith attempts to comply with an enabling statute, but the proceed-
ings taken by it are defective and the questions then arise, whether
the corporate character has been attained and what is the measure of
the liabiity of the associates to the creditors of the association.
The authorities on these questions are numerous and somewhat
inharmonious. The most recent and conservative authorities recog-
nize the hardship of holding the associates liable as partners when
they have in good faith attempted to limit their liability and lay down
the rule that where the defect is formal rather than essential, the
incorporation cannot be questioned collaterally and the associates
are liable only as shareholders. If the proceedings have been such
that a de facto, but not a de jure corporation has been organized, the
associates will be considered as shareholders and the incorporation
can be questioned only by the state in quo warranto proceedings.4
However, the statement of this rule is easier than its application.
The question at once arises, what is formal and what is essential.
So far as I have been able to discover, the authorities have laid down
2. Miller v. Ewer, 27 Me. 509; Wechselberg v. Flour City Nat. Bank,
64 Fed. 90, 95.
3. Helliwell on Stock and Stockholders, Sec. 438; Alokelumne Hill
Mining Co. v. Woodbury, 14 Cal. 424; Finnegan v. Noerenber-, 52 Minn.
239; Kaiser v. Lawrence Savings Bank, 56 Ia. 104; Guckert v. Hacke,
159 Pa. 303; Abbott vz. Omaha Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 4 Y6; Jones v. A4spen
Hardware Co., 23 Col. 263; Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 Ill. T97.
4. Cook on Corporations, Sec. 234; Helliwell on Stcck and Stockholders,
Sec. 438; Mokelumne Hill Mining Co. v. Woodbury, 14 Cal. 424; Finnegan
vt. ANoerenberg, 52 Minn. 239; Kaiser v. Lawrence Savings Pliwk, 56 Ia.
In4; Guckbert v. Hacke, i5g Pa. 303; Abbott v. Omaha Smelting Co., 4
Neb. 416; Jones v. Aspen Hardware Co., 21 Col. 263; Bigelow v. Gregory,
73 Ill. r97,
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no general rule by which this question may be solved, 
each case
seeming to have been decided on its own merits.
To arrive at such a rule we must consider the reason 
underlying
the enabling laws. As we have already seen, these laws 
usually pro-
vide that the articles of incorporation shall be made a public 
record.
It is self-evident that the reason for this provision is 
publicity. It is
designed to give notice to those intending to deal with the 
company
that it is a corporation, the liability of the members 
of which is lim-
ited, and not a partnership. The required contents 
of the notice
usually are only matters of which the public should 
be advised for
its protection in dealing with the company.
I think that a rule which will come within the reason of the 
law,
is that all acts which the legislature has provided, shall 
be done for
the purpose of protecting the public in its dealings with 
the future
corporation, must be substantially done before a corporation 
can be
organized, either de jure or de facto. Any other rule would 
tend to
encourage secrecy and fraud. Certainly, associates secretly 
adopting
articles of incorporation and failing to give them the required 
pub-
licity, as they might adopt articles of co-partnership, cannot 
be said
to have advised the public of their intention to limit their 
individual
liability, and until such notice is given, the law very justly 
provides
that the public may hold them liable as partners; that 
no corpora-
tion, either de jure or de facto, has been created.
5
A de facto corporation may be defined as an association of 
indi-
viduals who may have made a bona fide and colorable attempt 
to
secure a charter and organize a corporation under an enabling 
act,
and who actually assume the use of corporate powers. That 
is to
say, there must be on the face of the record the appearance 
of having
substantially complied with the essentials of the act. If 
such be
the fact, the state alone can question the corporate existence; 
if such
be not the fact, at least so far as limitation of liability is concerned,
no corporation has been formed.
The wisdom of the law is in the legislature, not the courts, and
the courts cannot say that it is non-essential which the law either 
n
letter or in spirit makes essential.
7
If the associates file their articles of incorporation in a foreign
state and substantially comply with the requirements of its enabling
5. Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 Ill. x97; Finnegan v. Nroerenberg, 
52 Minn.
-39; Abbott v. Omaha Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 46.
6. Finnegan v. Noerenberg, 52 Minn. 239; Afontgomery v. Forbes,
148 Mass. 249; Martin v,. Deetz, 102 Cal. 55; Johnson 
v. Corser, 34 Minn.
355; Walton v. Oliver, 49 Kan. 107.
7. People v. A1fontecito Water Co., 97 Cal. 276.
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act, as we have already seen they receive in effect a charter from that
state; and that state for that enabling act, within the limitation pre-
scribed by the articles, confers upon them the right and authority to
organize a corporation. This organization must be effected pursuant
to such authority before the incorporation is complete. Where then
must the corporation be organized? Obviously the enabling act can
have no extra-territorial operation; the authority is derived onl,
from that act and cannot be conferred without the state. Accord-
ingly it follows that the corporation must be organized within the
boundaries of the state which authorizes its organization.8 In order
to hold an organization within the state of the residence of the
associates valid, it must be also held that the enabling or incorpora-
tion acts of every state, territory and foreign country are operative
in every other state and that any foreign jurisdiction by legislative
enactment or executive decree can enable citizens of another state
to associate as a corporation in that state and make the public record
of their incorporation in a distant and foreign state. To so hold is
to defeat the very policy of all incorporation laws, which, as we have
seen, is to give publicity to the fact of incorporation. There is no
rule of comity which permits a foreign sovereign to legislate within
the confines of the domestic state. To permit foreign laws so to
operate is to surrender sovereignty itself. "There is no rule of
comity which requires one state to be made the birthplace of corpo-
rations chartered by another."9
The associates can organize a corporation in the state of their
residence only under the enabling act of that state. If they attempt
to organize within that state under a grant of authority from a for-
eign state, the company which they organize is not a corporation.
The authority by virtue of which they attempt to organize has no
force, effect or existence in the state of their residences, and so far
as they are concerned, while acting in that state, the enabling act is
as though it had no existence whatsoever. The company which
they have organized is not even a de facto corporation, for, as has
already been seen, such a corporation is premised upon the existence
of an enabling act and an attempt to comply therewith, but they
have complied with an act which has no existence in the place of the
company's organization. Thomas H. Breeze.
8. Miller v. Ewer, 27 Me. 5og; Smith v. Silver Valley Smelting Co.,
64 Md. 85; Bank of Augusta v. Earle. 13 Pet. 5 9; Tioga R. R. v. Bloss-
berg, etc. R. R., 20 Wall. r37; Insurance Co. v. Francis, it Wall. 210; Ohio,
etc., R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, I Black 286; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 169.
Contra, Heath v. Silverthorn Lead Mining and Smelling Co., 39 Wis. 146.
9. Smith v. Silver Valley Smelting Co., 64 Md. 85.
